> ## Content Index > Fetch the complete content index at: https://www.nastycanuck.ca/llms.txt > Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further. # Canada’s First F-35 Is Flying. The Bigger Build Is Everything Around It. - URL: https://www.nastycanuck.ca/canadas-first-f35-bigger-build/ - Published: 2026-09-24T21:32:38.000Z - Updated: 2026-10-06T01:01:54.000Z - Description: Canada’s first CF-35A is flying, but the fighter is only one part of a wider RCAF overhaul spanning Arctic radar, GlobalEye, satellites, drones, tankers and sixth-generation aviation. - Author: Nasty Canuck Editorial Desk - Tags: Explainers, Defence, Royal Canadian Air Force, F-35, Arctic *Canada’s first CF-35A has taken to the air while Ottawa is still reviewing the fighter program. Around that unresolved decision, Canada is assembling new Arctic radar, airborne surveillance, military satellites, drones, tankers, patrol aircraft and a pathway into sixth-generation combat aviation. Replacing the CF-18 is only one part of the air-power system now taking shape.* Canada’s first F-35 is finally airborne. The first CF-35A destined for the Royal Canadian Air Force [made its maiden flight from Fort Worth, Texas, on September 23](https://skiesmag.com/news/canadas-first-cf-35a-fighter-jet-completes-maiden-flight/), already wearing Canadian markings. After years of procurement files and political argument, the first aircraft is now real and flying. The timing is awkward. Canada is entering the F-35 era before Ottawa has finished deciding how large that era will be. The original plan calls for 88 aircraft, while [Reuters reported in April that Ottawa has made a legal commitment of funds for the first 16](https://www.reuters.com/world/canada-is-still-reviewing-plan-buy-us-fighter-jets-defence-minister-says-2026-04-27/). Under National Defence’s current schedule, the first eight aircraft are to go to Luke Air Force Base in Arizona in 2026 and 2027 for Canadian pilot training, with the [first CF-35As expected at Cold Lake in late 2028](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/proactive-disclosure/2026/nddn-defence-industrial-strategy.html). The CF-18 fleet has already begun retiring and is scheduled to be gone by 2032. That leaves relatively little room for an abstract fighter debate. Defence Minister David McGuinty told a Senate committee that aircraft from other countries remain part of the review, and Reuters has identified Saab’s Gripen among the alternatives being discussed. Ottawa has not announced a mixed-fleet decision, but it has also not closed the review. The more Canada builds around its future fighters, the less useful it becomes to treat the issue simply as F-35 versus Gripen. ## The fighter is only the visible part Start with the Arctic. Canada and Australia moved the [Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar program](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2026/06/canadaaustralia-partnership-on-arctic-over-the-horizon-radar.html) into delivery this summer. Conventional radar is limited by the curvature of the Earth; A-OTHR is designed to use the ionosphere to see much farther beyond the normal radar horizon, giving Canada and NORAD more warning of airborne threats approaching through the North. Initial capability is expected by December 2029\. The radar itself represents a $2.5-billion commitment, while the broader Canadian program — including infrastructure, installation and integration — is valued at more than $6 billion. Canada is also negotiating for an airborne layer. In May, Ottawa chose Sweden’s Saab as the [preferred supplier for discussions on an Airborne Early Warning and Control capability](https://www.canada.ca/en/defence-investment-agency/news/2026/05/the-government-of-canada-selects-preferred-supplier-for-airborne-early-warning-and-control-discussions.html). Saab’s proposed GlobalEye system is built on Bombardier’s Canadian-made Global 6500 and is intended to detect, track and help manage threats over long distances, including in the Arctic. Preferred-supplier status is not a purchase contract, but it puts a capability Canada does not currently possess much closer to the centre of the RCAF modernization effort. Those two projects begin to change the way the fighter question looks. A CF-35 or Gripen does not patrol every kilometre of Canadian airspace waiting to stumble across a threat. Ground sensors, airborne surveillance and command systems help establish what is happening first, giving fighters somewhere useful to go and something useful to do once they get there. The same is true of communications. Ottawa awarded Telesat an [initial contract worth approximately $2.3 billion](https://www.canada.ca/en/defence-investment-agency/news/2026/08/the-government-of-canada-awards-a-military-communications-contract-to-support-arctic-sovereignty-and-national-security0.html) in August for secure military satellite communications, particularly across the Arctic and other high-latitude regions. The agreement expands Telesat’s Lightspeed low-Earth-orbit constellation by 69 satellites, from 156 already in production to 225, with the additional spacecraft to be built by MDA Space in Montréal. The broader project also includes a secure military medium-Earth-orbit component. Canada’s recent agreements with Norway add another layer. Canada and Norway are [working to improve interoperability between their satellite systems](https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2026/09/20/joint-statement-prime-minister-carney-prime-minister-norway-jonas-gahr), while Kongsberg and Telesat have agreed to explore Lightspeed connectivity with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems and other solutions. Kongsberg and MDA Space are separately exploring multi-domain and space-based ISR, including Arctic maritime awareness. These are exploratory arrangements, not a finished Canadian battle network, but they show where several investments could begin to meet. There is no evidence Ottawa designed every one of these projects as part of a single master plan. They solve different problems, come from different programs and will arrive on different schedules. Operationally, however, radar, aircraft, satellites, ships, command centres and uncrewed systems eventually have to exchange information if Canada wants them to produce more than a collection of expensive individual capabilities. ## Canada now has to operate on two procurement clocks Ukraine has added another dimension to that challenge. Ottawa’s new [Defence Drone Initiative Marketplace](https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2026/09/10/canada-and-ukraine-scale-drone-production-build-canadas-defence) is modelled on Ukraine’s Brave1 system and gives Canadian military and Coast Guard users access to nearly 400 trusted Canadian suppliers. Initial contracts worth up to $50 million are intended to increase the number of drones fielded by the Canadian Armed Forces tenfold, while the government says it wants domestic industry capable of producing millions of drones within two years. That is a very different industrial model from the one behind a fighter aircraft. An F-35 is expected to operate for decades and depends on long production cycles, specialized infrastructure, extensive training and long-term sustainment. Drone technology can change quickly as new designs encounter electronic warfare, counter-drone systems and lessons from actual operations. Canada has to become competent at both. The military still needs major platforms built to last, but it also needs a procurement system capable of testing, modifying and replacing technology before the administrative process outlives the product. The rest of the RCAF renewal sits between those extremes. Canada is acquiring [nine CC-330 Huskys](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/procurement/strategic-tanker-transport-capability-project.html) to replace the Polaris fleet, providing strategic transport and air-to-air refuelling, including eventual support for the CF-35A. Up to [16 P-8A Poseidons](https://www.canada.ca/en/services/defence/defence-equipment-purchases-upgrades/air-equipment-procurement/canadian-multi-mission-aircraft-project.html) are replacing the CP-140 Aurora for maritime patrol, surveillance and anti-submarine warfare. Production of Canada’s first P-8 began in February, and the current project schedule puts first delivery in 2027. Even the Snowbirds are caught in the generational change. [The CT-114 Tutor is flying its final Snowbirds season in 2026](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2026/05/government-of-canada-to-procure-new-aircraft-for-the-iconic-canadian-forces-snowbirds.html) before eventually giving way to the CT-157 Siskin II, based on the Pilatus PC-21\. That program has little to do with the fighter review, but it is another reminder of how much of Canada’s military aviation fleet is turning over at roughly the same time. Seen together, the pieces are easier to understand by function than by procurement file. Radar and airborne surveillance find and track. Satellites and communications networks move information. Tankers extend reach. P-8s watch the maritime approaches. Drones add relatively inexpensive sensors and other effects. Fighters provide capabilities those smaller systems cannot. By the time a fighter is actually launched, several other parts of the system may already have done the work of finding, tracking and passing along the threat. ## The trade dispute makes dependence harder to ignore This modernization is happening during an unusually strained period in the Canada-U.S. economic relationship. On September 16, the White House directed U.S. officials to [identify Canadian-origin products in the federal civilian procurement system that could be removed or made unavailable for purchase](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/09/restoring-reciprocity-in-government-procurement/) where permitted by law and warranted in response to Canada’s Buy Canadian policies. The memorandum does not impose a blanket prohibition on Canadian companies doing business with the U.S. government. It does provide a fresh example of how an integrated economic relationship can become part of a wider trade dispute. The F-35 shows how deep that integration already runs. National Defence says [more than C$5.2 billion in F-35 contracts have gone to more than 110 Canadian companies](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/proactive-disclosure/2026/nddn-defence-industrial-strategy.html), with 37 currently holding active contracts. Departmental material says that, as of December 2025, each F-35 coming off the production line contained more than C$3.3 million in Canadian-made components. Neither fact settles the fighter review. The industrial benefits of the F-35 do not determine which force structure best meets Canada’s military requirements, and worsening trade relations do not automatically make an alternative aircraft the better choice. They do make the dependency question harder to avoid. A more diversified fleet could spread some supplier and industrial exposure across more countries, but it could also bring additional maintenance systems, training pipelines, spare-parts inventories, weapons integration and support costs. Staying predominantly with the F-35 preserves commonality with a large allied fleet and an industrial system in which Canadian firms already participate, while leaving Canada more deeply embedded in an American-led program. Canada will remain dependent on allies and foreign suppliers either way; the real issue is how much operational risk, cost and complexity it is willing to accept in each relationship. ## Then there is the aircraft after the aircraft The fighter review also has to contend with technology moving beyond both the F-35 and Gripen. Canada became the [first observer nation in the Global Combat Air Programme](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2026/07/quadrilateral-joint-statement-on-canada-becoming-an-observer-to-gcap.html) in July. The British, Italian and Japanese partnership is developing a sixth-generation combat aircraft for around 2035\. Observer status gives Canada access to information about the program’s governance, capabilities and industrial framework; it does not commit Ottawa to buying the aircraft. That puts several timelines into the same policy discussion. The CF-18 has to be replaced within the next several years. The F-35 is already entering Canada’s training and delivery pipeline, while Gripen remains relevant to the unresolved shape of the near-term fighter fleet. GCAP belongs to the generation after that. The problem for Ottawa is therefore broader than choosing which fighter it prefers. Canada has to get from the CF-18 era into modern air combat without leaving a capability gap, while avoiding a force structure so fragmented that the RCAF cannot afford to train, maintain and operate it. ## Buying the equipment is only half the job There is a less photogenic constraint on all of this: Canada has to absorb what it is buying. The Auditor General found that the [estimated cost of the F-35 project rose from $19 billion in 2022 to $27.7 billion by 2024](https://www.canada.ca/en/auditor-general/media-room/osh-20251007-e-44734.html). At least another $5.5 billion in infrastructure upgrades, advanced weapons and other elements required for full operational capability sat outside that estimate. The same audit found two permanent fighter-squadron facilities were more than three years behind schedule and that the planned pilot-training program would not produce enough qualified fighter pilots by 2032–33. Those findings are a useful check on the tendency to measure military modernization by contracts signed or aircraft ordered. A fleet becomes capability only when the aircraft can fly, trained crews are available, maintainers can support them, bases are ready, weapons and fuel are available, and the information required for operations reaches the right place. That integration problem extends beyond the F-35\. Canada is simultaneously introducing new fighters, tankers, patrol aircraft, drones, surveillance capabilities, satellite communications and training systems. The individual projects can each succeed on their own terms and still fall short of producing the coherent force Canadians expect if the people, infrastructure and networks do not keep pace. ## The bigger build The maiden flight of Canada’s first CF-35A is worth marking. After years of debate, the first Canadian aircraft is real, it is flying, and the transition away from the CF-18 is no longer something that exists only on a procurement schedule. It is also a good moment to look beyond the aircraft. Canada is assembling longer-range Arctic detection, airborne surveillance, Canadian military satellite communications, new drone capacity, tankers, maritime patrol aircraft and access to a sixth-generation fighter program. Some pieces are contracted, some are being delivered, some remain under negotiation and some are still exploratory. Calling all of it an integrated new air-power architecture today would get ahead of the evidence; whether Canada can turn those pieces into one is the more important test. Replacing the CF-18 is only part of that job. The fighter Canada ultimately flies has to connect with sensors that can find threats, networks that can move information, aircraft that can extend its reach and a military capable of keeping the entire system operating. There is a broader sovereignty question sitting behind all of this as well. The emerging mix reaches through the United States, Sweden, Australia, Norway, Ukraine, Britain, Italy and Japan, while Canadian firms such as Bombardier, Telesat and MDA hold important pieces at home. Canada is not going to become independent of allies, nor would trying to build every capability domestically necessarily make it more secure. The harder question is how deliberately Canada chooses those relationships, how much critical dependence it concentrates in any one place, and how much redundancy it is prepared to pay for when circumstances change. That question deserves more room than this article has left. --- **Editor’s note:** This is the first article in Nasty Canuck’s *Building Canadian Air Power* series. A follow-up will examine how Canada is distributing critical defence relationships across Canadian-controlled capabilities and trusted allies, and how that changes the meaning of defence sovereignty.